There have recently been numerous suggestions for monetary policy to engineer higher inflation expectations so as to stimulate spending. But what is the empirical relationship between inflation expectations and spending? We use the underlying micro data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers to test whether increased inflation expectations are indeed associated with greater reported readiness to spend. Cross-sectional data deliver the necessary variation to test whether the relationship between inflation expectations and spending changes in the recent zero lower bound regime compared to normal times, as suggested by many standard models. We find that the impact of inflation expectations on the reported readiness to spend on durable goods is small in absolute value when compared to other variables, such as household income or expected business conditions. Moreover, it appears that higher expected price changes have an adverse impact on the reported readiness to spend. A one percent increase in expected inflation reduces the probability that households have a positive attitude towards spending by 0.15 percentage points. At the zero lower bound this small adverse effect remains, and is, if anything, exacerbated. We also extend our analysis to the reported readiness to spend on cars and houses and obtain similar results. Altogether our results tell a cautionary tale for monetary (or fiscal) policy designed to engineer inflation expectations in order to generate greater readiness to spend. JEL Codes: D12, E21, E31, E52.
Introduction
There have recently been suggestions by economists and policy-makers alike to engineer higher private sector inflation expectations with the goal of stimulating spending. 1 The German author Lion Feuchtwanger, in his celebrated portrayal of the late Weimar Republic and the early Nazi era, "The Oppermanns", describes rather intuitively why inflation might be good news for debtors and businesses. Basic economic theory echoes some of these ideas on how inflation expectations and spending relate. Increased inflation expectations might lower real interest rates and might thus boost interest-sensitive components of aggregate demand. Increased inflation expectations mean expected wealth gains for debtors. To the extent that debtors have on average higher propensities to spend out of wealth than creditors, increased inflation expectations again might lead to higher spending; especially in a balance sheet recession. On the other hand, inflation is also a tax on economic activity, so that higher inflation expectations may portend bad times ahead.
The purpose of this paper is to provide some econometric evidence on the nexus between inflation expectations and spending at the level of economic decision-makers, specifically households. To do so, we make use of the cross-sectional data on inflation expectations and readiness to spend from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. Using cross-sectional data helps us identify what this link is at the level of economic decision makers and whether it works differently at the zero lower bound compared to normal times, as many standards models suggest. Given that in U.S. post-war history zero lower bound regimes have been rare occurrences (they are in point of fact a singular event), it is difficult to investigate empirically with only aggregate data the relationship between inflation expectations and the readiness to spend at very low nominal interest rates. 1 Ken Rogoff (in Ydstie, 2011) : "They need to be willing, in fact actively pursue, letting inflation rise a bit more.
That would encourage consumption. It would encourage investment"; and Naryana Kocherlakota (in WSJ.com, 2010): "To a limited extent, this should be a good thing in some sense, to have more expected inflation"
The literature is split about the effectiveness and desirability of using inflation expectations as a means of stabilization policy. For the case of monetary policy this has been advocated by Krugman (1998) , Eggertson and Woodford (2003) , and Eggertson (2006) . Eggertson (2010) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2010) show in standard new Keynesian models that the fiscal multiplier may be large when the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates is binding due to the interaction between inflation expectations and real interest rates. Eggertson (2008) argues that it was a mix of fiscal and monetary policies designed to generate inflation expectations that led to the recovery from the Great Depression. On the other hand, economists like Edward Leamer (in Leamer, 2011) have polemicized against the role of deflation or inflation expectations as being important for stabilization policy. Paul Volcker (in Volcker, 2011) and John
Taylor (in Ydstie, 2011 ) view the engineering of higher inflation expectations as dangerous and, ultimately, as a sign of desperation that portends bad times ahead. This paper attempts to shed some empirical light on these competing viewpoints.
We start by exploiting the fact that the Michigan Survey of Consumers not only asks whether respondents think that now is a good or bad time to buy major household durables, cars and houses, but it also asks for reasons for a given answer. Using these simple descriptive statistics, we find that higher expected prices were never the major reason to buy household appliances, cars or houses now. The single most important reason to buy household appliances is "Good buys are available". For cars and houses, "Good buys are available" often switches the position of top reason with "Interest rates are low". Conversely, lower expected prices are cited only by a small fraction of respondents as a reason not to buy now, both for household appliances and cars as well as houses. What is more: the fraction of respondents that cite lower expected prices as a reason not to buy now has not significantly increased during the Great Recession and the zero lower bound episode. However, answer categories that are related to the overall economic or personal employment situation have become dominant, categories that play only a minor role during normal times. This means there is little prima facie evidence of a deflation-related waiting attitude in consumers' demand for durables.
The next step is to analyze the data more formally. Given the discrete and qualitative nature of respondents' answers to questions about whether now is a good time to buy large household items, we employ ordered probit models to investigate the relationship between expected inflation and reported readiness to spend. Controlling for both aggregate and idiosyncratic economic conditions and expectations, this empirical specification allows us to estimate the effect of increased inflation expectations on the probability of answering that now is a good time to spend. We allow for state-dependence of this relationship and investigate whether the link between inflation expectations and the reported readiness to spend is different at the zero lower bound compared to normal times. Ideally, we would like to examine the relationship between inflation expectations and actual expenditure. Given that there is no information on actual expenditure in the survey (or any other survey that contains information on inflation expectations), we view the qualitative buying conditions questions as the best available proxy. Furthermore, at the aggregate level, we show in Section 2 that the responses to the buying condition question are strongly and significantly correlated with actual expenditure.
We find that the impact of inflation expectations on the reported readiness to spend on durables is small in absolute value when compared to other variables, such as household income or business conditions. Moreover, higher expected price changes have an adverse impact on spending. A one percent increase in expected inflation reduces the probability that households have a positive attitude towards spending by 0.15 percentage points. At the zero lower bound this adverse effect is the same or even more negative in comparison with normal times.
We also extend our analysis to the buying conditions for cars and houses and obtain similar results. Moreover, the results appear robust across a variety of different model specifications.
Altogether, and with some caveats that we will discuss below, our results tell a cautionary tale for monetary (or fiscal) policy designed to engineer inflation expectations in order to generate greater readiness to spend.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the micro data and our empirical strategy. Section 3 documents the results for durable goods, extends the analysis to cars and houses, and presents robustness checks. A final section concludes.
Empirical Setup

Data Sources
We use the underlying micro data from the Survey of Consumers conducted by the Survey Re- We thus do not view the 'limited' data availability in the survey as a problem.
As an alternative to household consumer durables, we also consider questions about the readiness to buy cars and houses, using the following survey questions: While we believe that one-year ahead inflation expectations cover the right time horizon for smaller household consumer durables and are also more precisely answered by survey participants, we include, as a robustness check, specifications with five-year ahead inflation expectations that the survey started to ask about in 1990.
Q 5 "By about what percent per year do you expect prices to go (up/ down) on the average, during the next 5 to 10 years?"
4 See the Appendix for a complete overview of the survey questions used.
Summary Statistics
Before analyzing the data using ordered probit models, we present summary statistics on both the buying conditions and inflation expectations questions. Figure 1 Figure 2 shows a scatterplot of the two series. There is evidence for a positive correlation between the average reported readiness to spend on durables and aggregate durables consumption. The contemporaneous correlation among the series is 0.46. Figure 3 displays the dynamic correlogram between the reported readiness to spend in the survey and the actual aggregate spending series. It has a peak correlation of 0.51 at a lead of the readiness series of 3 months. Overall, we conclude that the reported readiness to spend on durables is a reasonable proxy (or predictor) for movements in aggregate durables consumption.
We plot the average of the one-year ahead expected inflation rate across individual responses at each point in time together with the actual inflation rate in Figure 4 . The shaded gray regions represent +/-one standard deviation of the survey responses. The actual inflation rate is the corresponding 12 months ahead rate as measured by the headline CPI, and has thus been brought into sync with inflation expectations. Overall, it appears that the one-year inflation expectations from the Michigan Survey of Consumers track the actual inflation rate reasonably well. The graph also suggests that we have sufficient variation across households in inflation expectations to learn from a cross-sectional analysis of the data. Figure 5 plots the five-to-tenyear-ahead inflation expectations. Even for longer horizon inflation expectations we have a 5 We use the series on Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durables (PCEDGC96) from the Federal Reserve Economic database (FRED). Since the series starts only in 1995, we obtain the corresponding nominal series (PCEDGC) for the period prior to 1995 and deflate it with the linearly interpolated quarterly price index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Table 2. 3.4). We link both series.
substantial amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity that should help us identify the link between long-term inflation expectations and spending.
Ordered Probits
Our benchmark regression specification takes the following form (we suppress time and household indices for better readability): 
with threshold values α 1 and α 2 . We estimate this model as an ordered probit, using the observations on y to estimate (β 1 , β 2 , γ) as well as α 1 and α 2 . This specification allows us to estimate the marginal effects of increased inflation expectations on the probability that a household finds buying conditions favorable, both inside and outside the zero lower bound regime. β 1 measures the partial effect of an increase in expected inflation on willingness to buy during normal times, while β 1 + β 2 measures the partial effect at the zero lower bound.
γ denotes the coefficient vector for the controls. We start by including (qualitative) idiosyncratic expectations about the idiosyncratic situation of the household: its expected change in financial situation (Q6) and the expected trajectory of its real income (Q7). Like the buying attitudes question, these responses are coded in one of three discrete categories: up, down, or 6 We experimented with ordered logits and found very similar results.
"about the same". Next, we include idiosyncratic expectations about the aggregate economic situation: the expected (qualitative) changes in the nominal interest rate (Q8) and the expected (qualitative) aggregate business conditions in a year (Q9). These responses are also encoded into one of three discrete categories. Finally, we include the current real income of the household. 7 As aggregate controls we use Q9 to construct an index of aggregate expectations about the aggregate economic situation: the index measures the share of respondents saying that the U.S. as a whole will have good business conditions during the next 12 months minus the share of those respondents answering that the country will have bad business conditions. We also construct an index for aggregate economic uncertainty by calculating the fraction of respondents saying that now is a bad time to buy major household items because the future economic situation is too uncertain (as a fraction of everybody saying that now is a bad time to buy).
The next set of controls concerns current aggregate conditions. We include the federal funds rate, the civilian unemployment rate (in percentage points) and the current inflation rate (percentage year over year change in the consumer price index). 8 As an alternative to the specification with aggregate controls, we also consider a specification where we control for aggregate effects using a set of year dummies. We drop all aggregate variables in this specification. 9 The final set of controls concerns demographic factors. We include a dummy which takes on unity for female respondents and zero for males ('Sex') as well as dummies for each race, except for non-hispanic Caucasians, i.e. 'African American', 'Hispanic American', 'Native American', and 'Asian American'. Finally, we add polynomials of the age of the respondent ('Age', 'Age 2 ', and 'Age 3 ') to account for possible changes in the life-cycle behavior of consumption.
Results
Reasons for Buying and Not Buying
The Michigan Survey not only asks whether now is a good or bad time to buy major household durables, cars and houses, but also asks for reasons for a given answer. For both categories, good and bad, we show the frequency of the five most important reasons related to buying conditions for major household durables in Figures 6 and 7 , respectively. The shares of these 7 We use the survey question on the current nominal household income (in U.S. dollars) and deflate it with the consumer price index (CPIAUCSL) from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank data base FRED. 8 The series are from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank data base FRED. We use FEDFUNDS, UNRATE and CPIAUCSL. 9 We also experimented with month dummies, but found their coefficients to be mostly insignificant. In any event, our main parameters of interest hardly changed, when we included such seasonal dummies. We also experimented with full time dummies instead of year dummies, but again found many of them insignificant. The computational burden would be much higher without any changes to our results.
top answers typically sum to a number around 70%. Figures 8 and 9 present the corresponding graphs for cars and Figures 10 and 11 for houses.
The answer "Prices are going up" was never the major reason to buy durables, cars or houses.
In fact, it ranks mostly third or fourth amongst the reasons for buying these items. The single most important reason for a favorable outlook on buying conditions for major household items is "Good buys available". 10 During the recent zero lower bound period the share of "Good buys available" is exceptionally large. Perhaps surprisingly, the answer "Interest rates are low"
does not play any role during this period. For cars and houses, "Good buys are available" often switches the position of top reason with "Interest rates are low".
Regarding the reasons why now is a bad time to buy major household items, cars or houses, the answer "Prices will fall later" is never the top answer, in particular not during the zero lower bound period. The fraction of respondents who give expected price decreases as the reason for not buying now is generally very much below 10 percent. A noticeable exception is the readiness to buy a house in the zero lower bound period. Also, in the very recent period of exceptionally low interest rates, the shares of the five most important answers across the whole sample period sum to a rather small number of around 15%. It turns out that the zero lower bound period seems to be different from the periods before in that answer categories such as "People can't afford to buy now; low levels of employment; times are bad; don't have money to spend; recession;
inflation" or "People should save money; uncertainty of future, bad times ahead, employment too uncertain" became dominant. Those catogeries play a minor role during normal times and have played a much smaller role during previous recessions.
Specification with One-Year Inflation Expectations
We report the estimation results for our baseline specification with the one-year inflation expectations in Table 1 . The table shows the estimated coefficients as well as marginal effects evaluated at the zero lower bound (ZLB=1) and for the case that interest rates are away from it (ZLB=0). 11 When calculating marginal effects, we set the remaining variables to their means conditional on ZLB=1 and ZLB=0, respectively. In each case we document the point estimates 10 There is some ambiguity about what "Good buys are available" exactly means. We interpret it as essentially meaning that households know of sales available for durables. 11 We report the marginal effects for the probability of the highest outcome, i.e. p 1 = P y = 1|z with z = together with standard errors in brackets below the point estimates, and denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level by ' * * * ', ' * * ', and ' * ', respectively. The corresponding estimates for the demographic controls are shown in Table 2 . They show that young, male, non-hispanic Caucasians are the biggest spenders on durable household items.
With respect to the coefficients of the control variables, we obtain plausible and significant estimates, except for the current inflation rate and the federal funds rate, for which we obtain insignificant estimates. As one would expect, the expected financial situation of the household and its real income, the expected business conditions (idiosyncratic and aggregate), and the current real household income all have positive effects on the reported spending readiness. Moreover, an expected increase in future nominal interest rates makes people want to spend more today, while higher uncertainty and unemployment rates decrease the probability that people find buying conditions favorable. Interestingly, the coefficient on the zero lower bound intercept dummy is positive (though not significantly so). It is important to keep in mind, though, that this is the impact of the zero lower bound episode after controlling for other aggregate variables.
For the expected one-year inflation rate, we obtain a significantly negative coefficient (β 1 = −0.0051), which is even more negative when the economy is at the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates (β 2 = −0.0089). Moreover, the marginal effect of expected inflation on spending is significantly different from zero and equal to −0.0015 for positive interest rates, meaning that a 1 percentage point increase in expected inflation approximately lowers the probability that households have a positive attitude towards spending by 0.15 percentage points. This result could be consistent with a forward-looking Taylor rule operating during normal times:
households with high inflation expectations may assume that the monetary policy maker adjusts nominal interest rates and by more than one-for-one to counteract increased inflation expectations, thus resulting in higher real interest rates. We control for nominal interest rate expectations, but due to the construction of the survey data we can do so only in a qualitative and thus imperfect way. This negative result is also consistent with the view of inflation being a tax on decentralized economic activity, an effect which has recently been found to be large in U.S. data by Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) . It is, finally, in line with the aforementioned Volcker-view of inflation as a sign of economic distress.
The adverse effect of inflation expectations and willingness to spend is even larger when evaluated at the zero lower bound (-0.34 percentage points). However, whether the zero lower bound binds or not, the impact of inflation expectations on desired spending is small in absolute value when compared to the impact of other variables. For example, a 1 percentage point decline in the current unemployment rate increases the probability that households report that now is a good time to buy major household items by more than 1 percentage point.
If the household reports that its financial situation is expected to improve the probability of a positive attitude towards spending increases by approximately 3 percentage points.
The coefficient estimates and marginal effects for the specification with year dummies instead of economically motivated aggregate controls are documented in Table 3 . Consistent with our previous results we obtain highly significant and plausible estimates for both the coefficients and marginal effects of the control variables. The impact of expected inflation on the household's attitude towards spending is again negative and small in absolute value in comparison with the impact of the current or expected idiosyncratic economic situation of the household. Again we obtain different marginal effects across the two monetary policy regimes. The estimated marginal effect during the zero lower bound period is negative and twice as large in absolute terms than that during normal times.
Specification with Five-to-Ten-Year Inflation Expectations
We show the estimation results for the specification with the five-to-ten-year inflation expectations and economically-motivated aggregate controls in Table 4 . We do not report the results for the demographic controls from now on because there is little to no variation across the different specifications. There is a possibility that longer-term inflation expectations conform better with the average time horizon for the buying decision on some consumer durables. Regarding the control variables, we conclude that replacing the one-year inflation expectations by the five-toten-year inflation expectations has neither an impact on the sign nor on the magnitude of the coefficients and marginal effects. Moreover, the statistical significance of the estimates is similar across specifications. With respect to the impact of five-to-ten-year inflation expectations on the reported readiness to spend, we again obtain negative estimates for the marginal effects (-0.09 percentage points at both D Z LB = 0 and D Z LB = 1, though not significantly different from zero for the latter), while the impact is also small in absolute value. Table 5 reports the estimation outcome for the specification with year dummies. The coefficient estimates as well as the estimated marginal effects for the controls remain significant and plausible. In line with our previous findings we estimate economically negligible marginal effects for the expected five-to-ten year inflation rate on the reported readiness to spend on durables for both the zero lower bound period and normal times. Moreover, the effects are negative for both monetary policy regimes, if insignificant for the zero lower bound episode.
Robustness Checks and Extensions
Subjective Probabilities for Real Income Gains and Job Losses
We investigate whether our results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls for idiosyncratic expectations about idiosyncratic economic situations. We add the subjective probabilities for real income gains (Q11) and job loss (Q12) to both the aggregate controls and the year dummy specification. The question on the probability of a job loss during the next 5 years is particularly interesting since we have not included a measure for the individual job situation (as opposed to the overall unemployment rate) so far. However, both questions are only available from 1998:01 onwards which limits our sample period. We thus consider them for robustness only.
The estimation results for the augmented models are reported in Tables 6 and 7 . Overall, our previous findings are not altered by including these two additional controls. Moreover, for both controls we obtain plausible and significant coefficient estimates and marginal effects throughout all specifications. The probability that households report a positive attitude towards spending increases with the probability of real income gains and decreases with the probability of a job loss.
Buying Conditions for Cars
The Michigan Survey of Consumers not only asks for buying conditions for major household durables but also whether the next 12 months or so will be a good or a bad time to buy a car (Q3). Using (Q3) we extend our study to the reported readiness to spend on cars. To this end we need to ensure that inflation expectations lie strictly in the future relative to the purchasing horizon. We thus account for the fact that the question asks not whether now is a good time to buy but instead refers to the next 12 months or so by restricting our analysis to the five-toten-years inflation expectations. Moreover, we include the expected change in gasoline prices over the next 5 years in cents per gallon (Q13) and an aggregate measure of the car loan rate as additional controls. 12 We show the results for cars in Tables 8 and 9 , respectively. The results are similar to those for durable household items. Increased five-to-ten-years inflation expectations reduce the probability that households report a positive attitude towards spending on cars. The effect is even more negative at the zero lower bound but still small in absolute value. For both additional controls, we obtain significant and plausible coefficient estimates and marginal effects. An increase in expected gasoline prices reduces the probability that households find buying condi-tions favorable. Moreover, higher car loan rates are associated with a smaller probability that households have a positive attitude towards spending on cars.
Buying Conditions for Houses
As a second extension, we consider the question on buying conditions for houses, asking if now is a good or a bad time to buy a house (Q4). To control for the financing costs , we add an aggregate measure of the 30-year mortgage rate to the model. 13 Unfortunately, the data on qualitative one-year and five-year house price expectations -(Q14) and (Q15), respectivelyare not available for the period prior to May 2007. 14 The results for houses are reported in Tables 10 to 17 . Altogether, expected inflation has similar effects on the reported readiness to buy houses as were found in the case of major household durables and cars. For the specifications without house price expectations and one-year inflation expectations, the mortgage rate has a significantly negative impact on the probability that households find buying conditions for houses favorable, while in other specifications, in particular when we control for expected house price changes, its coefficients and average marginal effects are insignificant. Increased house price expectations, however, have significantly positive effects on the probability that households have a positive attitude towards buying a house now.
Control Function Approach
As a final robustness check, we address the potential problem that inflation expectations are only observed with a measurement error, e.g. when survey respondents exert less effort to come up with their best estimate for the inflation outlook when answering the survey compared to when they actually go buy durable goods. A related concern is that we have failed to control for some factor relevant for both buying attitudes and inflation expectations. We follow the recommendation of Rivers and Vuong (1988) , Wooldridge (2002) as well as Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) and use a so-called control function (CF) approach. The CF approach is a two stage 13 The mortgage rate series is from the Federal Reserve Board of the Governors. The series ID is MORTG. 14 The qualitative house price expectations are coded '+1' for an expected increase in house prices, '0' for no price change, and '-1' for an expected decrease in house prices. The Michigan survey also asks for an expected percentage change in house prices. Unfortunately, this quantitative series shows a large number of missing observations and we thus decided not to use it.
instrumental variable estimation method that can also be applied to non-linear models. We proceed as follows.
First, we construct for eight different demographic groups (female/male cross Caucasian/ Non-Caucasian cross young/old) 15 a time series of group specific inflation expectations by averaging across individual expectations for each month. Since for all practical purposes the available data in the Michigan Survey does not allow researchers to follow households over time, it is not possible to construct a time series of inflation expectations for each individual household.
Given the group-specific inflation expectations, we can, however, attach an inflation expectation to each household and period, depending on which of these eight demographic groups households belong to.
Second, we use lagged inflation expectations as instruments in the CF approach. In particular, we regress in the first stage regressions household-specific inflation expectations on all exogenous variables plus 12 lags of the group-specific inflation expectations using ordinary least squares (OLS). We experimented with various lag structures and our results appear to be robust. The results of these first stage regressions are shown in Tables 18 and 19 . Table 19 shows that group-specific inflation expectations at most lags are highly significant predictors of household-specific inflation expectations and as such constitute reasonable instruments.
Finally, we add the first stage residuals to our probit models in order to control for the potential endogeneity of household-specific inflation expectations and any function of them, including the interaction term with the zero lower bound dummy (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007 , for the precise argument). The second stage, i.e. probit estimates are reported in Table   20 . The first important result is that the coefficients on the first stage residual in the second stage ordered probit are not statistically different from zero, which suggests that endogeneity of individual inflation expectations is indeed not likely a concern (see Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 15) . Secondly, the point estimates for the coefficients of interest, i.e. individual inflation expectations and individual inflation expectations interacted with the zero lower bound dummy, are hardly changed compared to the benchmark results. The only exception is the coefficient on individual inflation expectations in the year dummy specification, which changes from a significant -0.0014 to an insignificant 0.0074. However, the standard error on the latter is so large that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the benchmark estimate and the CF estimate are in fact the same. 15 We use a bivariate clustering method in age and inflation expectations to estimate a cut-off point between being young and old. The estimated value is approximately 48 years, which is close to both the sample mean and median age across individuals. We experimented with higher and lower cut-off points without any substantial effects on our results. This paper investigates empirically the link between inflation expectations and readiness to spend on large household items, both outside and inside the zero lower bound regime for the federal funds rate. We do so using cross-sectional household data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. We find little evidence to support the idea that inflations expectations matter for the buying decisions of households, either inside or outside the lower bound. If anything our results support the view that higher inflation as a tax on economic activity means future welfare losses, or even portends the impotence of macroeconomic stabilization policy and economic distress in the future. While we are of course aware that our reduced-form results are subject to the Lucas critique, we nevertheless think that they tell a cautionary tale about the notion that stabilization policy at the zero lower bound should attempt to generate inflation expectations to lower real rates and stimulate spending. After all, why should a household which for idiosyncratic reasons has high inflation expectations and is not inclined to purchase household durables, cars or houses, should change its mind, when these inflation expectations have been Notes: this figure shows a scatter plot between the reported readiness to spend on durables (see notes to Figure  1 ) and the detrended actual aggregate spending series together with a fitted regression line. We apply an HP-filter (with smoothing parameter λ = 129, 600) to the actual aggregate spending series in order to obtain a measure for the cyclical component of consumer spending. Notes: this figure shows the top five reasons why people are saying that now is a good time to buy durable consumption goods. Conditional on saying that now is a good time to buy, people are asked for one particular reason, meaning that the fractions of all possible reasons sum to 100 percent. For better readability we plot quarterly averages of the monthly numbers. Notes: this figure shows the top five reasons why people are saying that now is a bad time to buy durable consumption goods. Conditional on saying that now is a bad time to buy, people are asked for one particular reason, meaning that the fractions of all possible reasons sum to 100 percent. For better readability we plot quarterly averages of the monthly numbers. Notes: this figure shows the top five reasons why people are saying that now is a bad time to buy a car. Conditional on saying that now is a bad time to buy, people are asked for one particular reason, meaning that the fractions of all possible reasons sum to 100 percent. For better readability we plot quarterly averages of the monthly numbers. Notes: this figure shows the top five reasons why people are saying that now is a good time to buy a house. Conditional on saying that now is a good time to buy, people are asked for one particular reason, meaning that the fractions of all possible reasons sum to 100 percent. For better readability we plot quarterly averages of the monthly numbers. Notes: this figure shows the top five reasons why people are saying that now is a bad time to buy a house. Conditional on saying that now is a bad time to buy, people are asked for one particular reason, meaning that the fractions of all possible reasons sum to 100 percent. For better readability we plot quarterly averages of the monthly numbers. Notes: '***', '**', and '*' denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are in paranthesis. The Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) Dummy takes on unity from 2008:12 to 2010:12 (and zero otherwise). Marginal effects measure the effect of a particular variable on the probability that households find buying conditions favorable in percentage points; evaluated within and outside the ZLB regime with the remaining variables set at their respective conditional means (further details on the calculation of marginal effects are provided in Footnote 9 in the main text). The dependent variable is "Buying conditions for household durable", based on (Q1), which is coded '+1' for good, '0' for neither good nor bad, and '-1' for bad. Table 1 . The demographic controls include a dummy which takes on unity for female respondents and zero for males ('Sex') as well as dummies for each race, except for non-hispanic Caucasians, i.e. 'African American', 'Hispanic American', 'Native American', and 'Asian American'. We also add polynomials of the age of the respondent ('Age', 'Age 2 ', and 'Age 3 '). Notes: see notes to Table 1 . We add the subjective probability for an adult household member to become unemployed in the next five years (Q12) and the subjective probability of real income gains in the next five years (Q11) as additional controls. Notes: see notes to Table 1 . The dependent variable is "Buying conditions for car", based on (Q3), which is coded '+1' for good, '0' for neither good nor bad, and '-1' for bad. We add the car loan rate from the Federal Reserve Board of the Governors and the expected gasoline price change over the next five years in cents per gallon and based on (Q13) as additional controls. Notes: see notes to Table 1 . The dependent variable is "Buying conditions for houses", based on (Q4), which is coded '+1' for good, '0' for neither good nor bad, and '-1' for bad. We add the mortgage rate from the Federal Reserve Board of the Governors as an additional control. Tables 1 and 10 . We add the qualitative one-year house price expectation of the households, based on (Q14), as an additional control. The variable is coded '+1' for an expected house price increase, '0' for no price change, and '-1' for an expected decrease in house prices. Notes: see notes to Table 1 . We add the five-year house price expectation of the households, based on (Q15), as an additional control. The variable is coded '+1' for an expected increase in house prices, '0' for no price change, and '-1' for an expected decrease in house prices. Table 19 ). Notes: this table shows the first stage regression results, estimated with OLS, of individual inflation expectations on our standard set of controls and group-specific lagged inflation expectations as instruments. We construct a time series of group specific inflation expectations for eight demographic groups (female/male cross Caucasian/NonCaucasian cross young/old) by averaging across individual expectations for each month. We use these group specific inflation expectations to attach an inflation expectation to each individual household and month depending on which of these eight groups households belong to. Lagged group-specific inflation expectations are then used to instrument for potential endogeneity of household-specific inflation expectations. 
